In a secure bit commitment protocol involving only classical physics, A commits either a 0 or a 1 to B. If quantum information is used in the protocol, A may be able to commit a state of the form α|0 + β|1 . If so, she can also commit mixed states in which the committed bit is entangled with other quantum states under her control. We introduce here a quantum cryptographic primitive, bit commitment with a certificate of classicality (BCCC), which differs from standard bit commitment in that it guarantees that the committed state has a fixed classical value. We show that no unconditionally secure BCCC protocol based on special relativity and quantum theory exists. We also propose complete definitions of security for quantum and relativistic bit commitment.
I. INTRODUCTION
The discovery of secure quantum key distribution [1] and other applications of quantum information raises the question: which cryptographic tasks can be guaranteed secure by physical principles? One task which has been extensively investigated is bit commitment(BC), an important cryptographic primitive with several applications. In this note, we distinguish between standard bit commitment and a stronger task, bit commitment with a certificate of classicality. We show that, while the former can be guaranteed secure by physical principles, the latter cannot. We also propose complete definitions of various types of physical security for bit commitment and related tasks.
II. PHYSICAL SECURITY
In the most commonly considered cryptographic scenario, A and B each occupy disjoint laboratories which are treated as effectively pointlike. Each trusts the integrity of their own laboratory but nothing outside; in particular, neither trusts the other to accurately declare their location. Under these assumptions, special relativistic signalling constraints cannot be relied on for security, and the parties are effectively restricted to protocols involving sequentially exchanged messages, each party waiting to receive one message before sending the next.
Special relativistic signalling constraints can, though, play a valuable rôle in ensuring security in cryptographic scenarios in which each party controls laboratories in two separate locations [12] . While these laboratories must be near to mutually agreed coordinates, this can be tested within a given protocol: no trust between the parties is required.
We will neglect the possibility of cryptographic protocols whose security relies on general relativity, on quantum field theory as opposed to quantum mechanics, on the details of the standard model, and so on. Similarly, we neglect the possibility of physically based attacks relying on properties of these theories. No practical protocols or attacks of these types have so far been suggested.
So far as physical security is concerned, then, cryptographic tasks can presently be classified according to whether they can be securely implemented by using classical information and relying on special relativity, by using quantum information and neglecting special relativity, or by relying both on the properties of quantum information and on special relativity, or whether they cannot be securely implemented at all. We can divide cryptographic protocols into the following classes. A classical protocol relies on the exchange of classical information, while a quantum protocol allows quantum information exchange. In a non-relativistic protocol, the signalling constraints imposed by special relativity are neglected, usually because they make no essential difference to the protocol's security. In a relativistic protocol, special relativity is taken as the underlying theory, and the parties are located so that relativistic signalling constraints play a crucial role by ensuring that some communications between them are generated independently.
Similarly, a classical attack on a protocol is a cheating attempt by one party which involves diverging from the defined protocol and which can be described by standard non-relativistic or special relativistic classical physicsi.e. without using quantum information. A quantum attack involves the transmission and/or manipulation of quantum information.
We now recall the definitions of secure bit commitment in classical cryptology. In a classical BC protocol A and B exchange classical data in such a way that B obtains an encoding of a bit from A. A need not necessarily know which bit she has encoded: she could build a random bit generator and encoder and not inspect its operations. But if she follows the protocol, either 0 or 1 is committed, even if she does not know which. For the protocol to be classically perfectly secure against B, it must guarantee to A that B cannot gain any information about a committed bit until A chooses to reveal it. For it to be classically perfectly secure against A, it must guarantee to B that a committed bit is genuinely fixed between commitment and revelation. That is, there must not be a cheating method allowing A any chance of revealing the opposite bit to that committed. More precisely (since A might have sent nonsense), perfect security requires that unless A committed a bit a via the protocol, her probability of later revealing a should be zero.
A security parameter in a BC protocol is a positive integer parameter, N , such that security can be increased by increasing N . The protocol is classically secure modulo certain assumptions if, when the assumptions hold, the probability of A successfully cheating by classical attacks and the information available to B about the bit before revelation can simultaneously be made arbitrarily small by taking N sufficiently large It is unconditionally classically secure if its security is guaranteed if classical physics (in the case of relativistic protocols, special relativistic classical physics) is valid.
In a quantum BC protocol, it may be possible for A to commit a bit in an improper mixed state α|0 0|+β|1 1|, by entangling the committed state with another state kept under her control. She can do this, for example, by building a quantum computer which is programmed to follow the protocol for either of the orthogonal input states |0 or |1 and inputting a superposition. If she does so after entangling a second system | A with the input bit, by preparing α|0 |0 A + β|1 |1 A , she can keep this second system under her control throughout the commitment, carry out a measurement of the observable with eigenbasis |0 A , |1 A just before revelation, and then reveal either a 0 or a 1 to B depending on the measurement result. This possibility, whose security implications were first pointed out and investigated by Brassard et al. [11] , is not considered a security failure of a quantum BC protocol per se, although it can open up new cheating possibilities for A if the protocol is part of a larger cryptographic scheme.
So, we need revised definitions of security for quantum bit commitment. Complete definitions of security for non-relativistic quantum BC does not seem to have been set out yet, no doubt partly because it is known [6, 7, 10, 5, 8] that, under any reasonable definition, unconditional security is unattainable for non-relativistic quantum BC protocols. However, precise definitions are needed to discuss security based on computational bounds for quantum BC and to discuss the security of relativistic quantum BC protocols. We propose definitions of security for non-relativistic quantum BC below, and extend them to the relativistic case.
For a non-relativistic quantum BC protocol to be perfectly secure against B, it must guarantee to A that B can obtain no information about a committed bit until A chooses to reveal it. For it to be perfectly secure against A, it must guarantee to B that A cannot act between commitment and revelation so as ever to obtain some chance of choosing between revealing 0 and 1. More precisely, define p 0 (t) be the probability of A revealing to B a 0 without giving him evidence that she has violated the protocol, assuming that from time t onward she follows a strategy that maximizes her chances of doing so. Define p 1 (t) similarly. Let p(t) = p 0 (t) + p 1 (t). Assume that B knows the commitment phase has ended at t = 0. Then B must be guaranteed that, however A acts after t = 0, it must always be the case that p(t) ≤ 1 for all t > 0.
A security parameter for a quantum BC protocol is a variable positive integer parameter, N , such that security can be increased by increasing N . More precisely, we say a non-relativistic quantum BC protocol is secure modulo certain assumptions if, when the relevant assumptions hold:
(i) A is guaranteed that the information available to B during the protocol about the bit to be revealed can be bounded by ǫ.
(ii) B is guaranteed that, for every possible strategy of A's, the a priori probability of her making p(t) > 1, for any t > 0, is uniformly bounded, whenever B is persuaded at t = 0 that A has followed the commitment phase of the protocol. I.e., for any ǫ ′ > 0, there is an ǫ ′′ such that, regardless of the A's strategy,
(iii) For any ǫ ′ > 0, ǫ and ǫ ′′ can simultaneously be made arbitrarily small by increasing the security parameter.
A non-relativistic quantum BC protocol is unconditionally secure if its security is guaranteed if nonrelativistic quantum mechanics is valid.
For relativistic quantum BC protocols, we use similar definitions. There must be some spacetime point P at which B is persuaded that A is committed. For any space-time point Q, let P C(Q) be the past light-cone of Q andP C(Q) be the rest of spacetime. We now define p 0 (Q) to be the probability of A revealing to B a 0 without giving him any evidence that she has violated the protocol, assuming that inP C(Q) she follows a strategy that maximizes her chances of doing so, and p 1 (Q) similarly, and set p(Q) = p 0 (Q) + p 1 (Q). For perfect security we then require that, if B is persuaded of a commitment at P , then however A acts inP C(P ), we must have p(Q) ≤ 1 for all Q inP C(P ). The definitions of security modulo assumptions are modified similarly. A relativistic quantum BC protocol is unconditionally secure if its security is guaranteed if quantum mechanics and special relativity are valid.
All non-relativistic classical BC schemes are in principle insecure, though very good practical security can presently be attained. Several quantum BC schemes have been proposed [2] [3] [4] . Again, for practical purposes, these schemes generally offer very good security at present. However, in principle they are insecure. More generally, it was shown independently by Lo and Chau [5, 8] and by Mayers [6, 7, 10] that no non-relativistic quantum BC schemes can be perfectly secure against both Bob and Alice. The restriction to non-relativistic schemes, though not made clear in the cited papers, is crucial.
The Lo-Chau-Mayers result was extended by Mayers [6, 7, 10] to give a proof of the general impossibility of unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment. Again, it should be noted that, despite initial suggestions to the contrary [6] , Mayers' proof applies only to non-relativistic schemes [12, 13] . We refer here to the result that unconditionally secure non-relativistic quantum bit commitment is impossible as the NRQBC no-go theorem.
More recently, several relativistic classical BC protocols have been proposed [12, 13] . These schemes are evidently secure against classical attacks and are all conjectured to be secure against quantum attacks. Though the first protocol proposed [12] requires an exponentially increasing communication rate for its implementation, the later protocols [13] can be implemented indefinitely over communication channels of fixed capacity. No sharp optimality results are known; further refinements can undoubtedly be made. Our aim here, though, is not to examine the situation regarding BC protocols in more detail, but to consider BCCC protocols.
IV. BIT COMMITMENT WITH A CERTIFICATE OF CLASSICALITY
For many purposes, it would be desirable to have a BC protocol which is guaranteed to behave like a classical protocol, preventing A from exploiting the dangerous possibility [11] of committing a bit state which remains entangled. Formally, we define bit commitment with a certificate of classicality (BCCC) to be a bit commitment in which the revelation of a bit a guarantees that this particular bit was originally committed by A. This does not necessarily imply that A was aware of the value of a. As with ordinary BC, she could arrange to remain ignorant, for instance by using a classical randomising device to prepare a proper mixed state and not inspecting the device.
We say a BCCC protocol is perfectly secure against B if it guarantees to A that B can obtain no information about the committed bit until A chooses to reveal it. We say it is perfectly secure against A, if a revelation by A guarantees to B that the revealed bit was previously committed: i.e., by some point in the protocol, a valid commitment by A corresponds to her having input one of the states |0 , |1 into some device which generates her transmissions to B during the remainder of the protocol, and a valid revelation of a guarantees to B that (precisely) the state |a was input at that point. As in the case of BC protocols, it must be possible to continue the commitment for arbitrarily long between this point and the moment of revelation.
A security parameter N for a BCCC protocol is defined essentially as for a BC protocol. Thus, we say a BCCC protocol is secure modulo certain assumptions if, when the assumptions hold, a revelation of a guarantees that, with probability 1 − ǫ, the fidelity of A's input state to the state |a differed from 1 by no more than ǫ ′ , while the information available to B about the bit during the protocol is no more than ǫ ′′ , where ǫ, ǫ ′ , ǫ ′′ can simultaneously be made arbitrarily small by taking N sufficiently large. A non-relativistic BCCC protocol is unconditionally secure if its security is guaranteed if quantum mechanics is valid. A relativistic BCCC protocol is unconditionally secure if its security is guaranteed if quantum mechanics and special relativity are valid.
V. UNCONDITIONALLY SECURE BCCC IS IMPOSSIBLE
The main point of this paper is to show that no unconditionally secure BCCC protocol, relativistic or otherwise, exists. We first give the proof, and then comment.
It is enough to show that no unconditionally secure relativistic protocol exists. We prove this by contradiction. Suppose that some unconditionally secure BCCC protocol existed. Such a protocol might require A and B to occupy many sites, say A 1 , ...., A m and B 1 , ...., B n . Their locations may be time-dependent, provided that the relevant worldlines are timelike and that A and B's sites are always disjoint. We add a further constant velocity site B 0 for B, and use its stationary frame to define the time coordinate. Now suppose that A and B agree a large number M , a much larger number N 0 >> M , and a large value N 1 for the security parameter. They also fix times of transmissions between their sites so as to run simultaneously 2N 0 BCCC protocols. A chosen randomly and independently 2N 0 bits, and commits those bits to B in the BCCC protocols.
Regardless of the relative separations of the sites, B can establish some time t c after the start of the protocols at which B 0 knows that, if A has followed the BCCC protocols correctly, she is now committed (to the extent that the security parameter prescribes). A is then required to send B 0 , after time t c , a sequence of N 0 spin 1/2 particles in one of the four spin states | ↑ , | ↓ , | ← , | → . (The first two are eigenstates of σ z ; the last two of σ x .) This sequence is supposed to be correlated with the sequence of N 0 pairs of BCCC protocols given by the first two, the second two, and so on. In each case, if the committed bits are respectively (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1) , the state sent is supposed to be | ↑ , | ↓ , | ← , | → .
Once B 0 has received and stored the N 0 states, he randomly picks (N 0 − M ) of them, and sends a message to A asking her to reveal the corresponding commitments. Some time t r > t c is fixed such that the revealed bits are communicated back to B 0 from the B i by time t r . B 0 then checks that the revealed bits do indeed characterise the spin-1/2 particle states, by carrying out measurements in the appropriate basis for each of the (N 0 − M ) particles. If the tested particles pass these checks, B accepts that the remaining M particles are also (to very good approximation) in pure, unentangled eigenstates of σ x or σ z . The corresponding 2M BCCC protocols play no further rôle, and are now suspended, without A revealing the corresponding bits to B.
A can now commit a single bit a to B via the following BC protocol. Each of the M untested spin-1/2 particles is (to good approximation) in a σ z or σ x eigenstate. Each of these states is known to A but not to B. We let the variable b be x or z, andb the alternative. For a particle in a σ b eigenstate, A declares that, if the committed bit is a, the particle is a σ b eigenstate, while if the committed bit isā, the particle is a σb eigenstate.
As the committed bits in the BCCC protocols were random, these declarations give B no information about the bit a. But, since the BCCC protocols ensured that A would almost certainly have been detected cheating unless she sent the particles in (nearly) pure σ x or σ z eigenstates, this BC protocol does indeed commit her to a. If she follows the protocol, she can reveal a by giving B the list of spin states, which he can check by measurements in the appropriate bases. But if she is dishonest, for one of the two possible commitments, say a f , at least M/2 of declarations are false. Her probability of persuading B that the committed bit was a f , by producing for him a list of spin states which pass his tests, is approximately (1/2) M/2 . I.e., for sufficiently large values of M and the other parameters, B will almost certainly detect a cheating attempt. Now, if the BCCC protocols were unconditionally secure, then the ensuing BC protocol is also unconditionally secure. In other words, by combining these protocols into one, we have an unconditionally secure relativistic BC protocol with the property that after a finite number of transmissions the commitment is complete. While unconditionally secure relativistic BC protocols exist [12, 13] , these protocols require that transmissions continue indefinitely up to revelation. The same argument used to establish the NRQBC no-go theorem [7, 10, 5, 8] shows that no finite unconditionally secure relativistic BC protocol exists. Hence unconditionally secure BCCC is impossible.
VI. DISCUSSION
This result re-emphasizes that classical cryptographic relations cannot naively be transferred into the quantum realm. In classical cryptology, non-relativistic or relativistic, there is no distinction between BC and BCCC: in quantum relativistic cryptology, BC can be implemented with unconditional security, while BCCC cannot.
A less direct argument for the impossibility of unconditionally secure BCCC follows from results of Yao [14] , which imply that unconditionally secure oblivious transfer (OT) could be built from unconditionally secure BCCC. Since non-relativistic BC can straightforwardly be constructed from OT, we again reach a contradiction with the NRQBC no-go theorem.
Note, finally, that while unconditionally secure BCCC is impossible, BCCC schemes with security based on computational assumptions are certainly possible. Most standard classical BC schemes that are perfectly secure against A -for example, those based on factorisation or obtaining a discrete logarithm -have this property. An interesting recent quantum BC proposal by Salvail [15] also has this property. It would be very interesting to understand whether BCCC schemes can be built with security based on assumptions which can confidently be relied upon in a future quantum technological era.
